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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE S. SORENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CLIFFORD G. SORENSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Appeal No. 870102-CA 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is the value of the good will of a professional dental 
proprietorship a divisable marital asset upon divorce. 
2. Does the district court's valuation of the dental practice 
constitute a clear abuse of its discretion. 
3. Is the district court's award of attorney's fees supported 
by evidence and by a stipulation at trial between the parties. 
4. Does the district court's award of expenses for expert 
witnesses constitute a clear abuse of its discretion. 
RULES DETERMINATIVE OF REVIEW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
This is an action for divorce and an equitable 
distribution of the marital assets. 
The Course of Proceedings 
Elaine S. Sorensen filed her complaint on March 22, 
1985, in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County. 
The complaint subsequently was amended on March 12, 1986. The 
action was tried by Judge Rodney S. Page, without a jury, on 
October 27 and November 14, 1986. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
On February 20, 1987, the Court entered a Decree of 
Divorce, dissolving the marriage between the parties and 
dividing the marital assets., This appeal followed. The Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(g) (1953). 
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Dr. Sorensen*s brief contains a long detailed 
statement of facts. Mrs. Sorensen flatly disputes many of the 
statements and she believes others unfairly characterize the 
1
 These abbreviations are used throughout: The record on 
appeal, as paginated by the court clerk, is designated "R"; the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered by Judge 
Rodney S. Page on February 24, 1987, are designated "Findings" 
or "Conclusions"; the Decree of Divorce, entered by Judge Page 
on February 24, 1987 is designated "Decree"; the transcript of 
the first day of trial is designated "Tr. Vol. I"; the 
transcript of the second day of trial is designated "Tr. Vol. 
II"; and the parties' trial exhibits are designated "Tr. Ex." 
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parties' marital history, their accumulation of assets, and the 
relative contributions of the parties. Nevertheless, Mrs. 
Sorensen will forego extended debate because those statements 
are largely irrelevant. The limited issues raised on appeal — 
all asserted by Dr. Sorensen to be questions of law — permit a 
more brief recitation of the relevant facts. It is sufficient 
to note the following: 
The parties were married 11 years. Dr. Sorensen is a 
dentist who has practiced alone in Roy, Utah, for 16 years. 
Mrs. Sorensen was not regularly employed outside the home 
during the marriage. At the time of trial, she was unemployed 
and attending college, pursuing an advanced degree in nursing. 
Among the many witnesses at trial were three called by 
the parties to value Dr. Sorensen's dental practice. Dr. 
Richard Austin testified for Mrs. Sorensen. He is a dentist 
practicing in the Salt Lake City area who also acts as a broker 
for the sale or purchase of dental practices. (Tr. Vol. I at 
59). Dr. Austin presented to the court a written valuation of 
Dr. Sorensen's dental practice. (Tr. Ex. D). The exhibit and 
his valuation of the practice were based upon information 
supplied earlier by Dr. Sorensen in his answers to 
interrogatories submitted by Mrs. Sorensen. (Tr. Vol. I at 
68). Dr. Austin valued the overall practice by calculating the 
value of three components. (Tr. Vol. I at 66-76). The first 
was "tangible assets," including furniture and equipment, for 
example. He valued those assets at $15,330. (Tr. Vol. I at 
68). The second component was "accounts receivable." He 
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excluded all accounts unpaid for over 120 days, then discounted 
by 12% (to allow for uncollectible accounts) the total of those 
accounts then outstanding for no more than 120 days. In this 
fashion he valued the accounts receivable at $22,170 as of 
October 21, 1986, one week before trial. (Tr. Vol. I at 69). 
The third component was "intangible assets," which included the 
"good will" of Dr. Sorensen's practice. Dr. Austin took the 
receipts and expenses of Dr. Sorensen's practice for three 
years and then calculated the average revenues over the period; 
that figure was $184,000. (Tr. Vol. I at 70). He discounted 
that figure by 66%, yielding $62,560 as the total value of the 
intangibles. When added together, the three components 
constituted Dr. Austin's total valuation of Dr. Sorensen's 
dental practice: $100,060. (Tr. Ex. D). 
Two accountants, Gerald Deters and Roger Nuttall, 
testified for Dr. Sorensen. Mr. Deters calculated the net 
income of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice in 1974 (before the 
parties' marriage) and in 1986 (after separation) and concluded 
the practice was then "a little bit bigger, a little better" 
than at the time of trial. (Tr. Vol. I at 287-289). Mr. 
Nuttall testified that Dr. Austin's valuation of the dental 
practice should be reduced by $10,129 to reflect existing 
accounts payable. (Tr. Vol. II at 23). He believed the 
practice was well established in 1974, that Dr. Sorensen was 
then earning a median salary, and that neither of those 
conditions changed appreciably during the marriage. (Tr. Vol. 
II at 27). 
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The district court took the matter under advisement* 
It made a ruling on January 5, 1987. (R. 65-78). The court 
believed the testimony of Dr. Austin. It found the total value 
of the practice to be $100,000. (R. 82; Findings If 14). The 
court discounted this figure by 10% because it also found that 
dental practices usually sell for approximately 90% of their 
appraised value. (R. 82; Findings If 15). Then, because Dr. 
Sorensen had been in practice for 16 years and the parties had 
been married for 11 of those years, the court took ll/16ths (or 
69%) of the $90,000 value, for a net sum of $62,100, 
representing the value of Dr. Sorensen1s practice. (R. 87; 
Conclusions 1f 7). The district court ordered an essentially 
equal division of the parties' property. The professional 
practice went to Dr. Sorensen with an equalizing credit to Mrs. 
Sorensen (R. 97; Decree 1f 26): 
MRS. SORENSEN DR. SORENSEN 
Dental practice $62,100 
*Farm 30,422 
Farm equipment 4,000 
Truck 400 
Spa 250 
*Dental building 11,457 
Piccolo 2,000 
Computer 3,000 
Motorcycles 1,500 
Pension interest 31,241 
TOTAL $14 6,370 
Less equity interest 
brought in 15,000 
$131,370 
Home 
Car 
Furniture & fixtures 
Piano 
Guitar 
Wolfcreek membership 
Yard equipment 
Camera 
Pension plan interest 
TOTAL 
Less equity interest 
brought in 
$100,000 
750 
6,500 
7,500 
160 
1,000 
555 
600 
20,104 
$136,369 
5.800 
$131,369 
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*Farm $ 78,200 
Contract Bienestar 19,165 
Home contract 42, 000 
TOTAL $13 9,3 65 
Less - 108,943 
Balance $30,422 
*Dental building $ 74,000 
Less contract to 
Thompsons - 42,543 
Less amount to 
defendant's mother 20,000 
Balance $ 11,457 
The court ordered Dr. Sorensen to pay his own 
attorney's fees and $2,000 towards his wife's fees. It ordered 
the parties to pay the expenses for their own expert 
witnesses. It also ordered them to divide evenly the expenses 
of one expert, Alan Heiskanen. (R. 96; Decree 1f 23). 
ARGUMENT 
Summary of Argument 
The district court properly included the value of good 
will in the overall valuation of Dr. Sorensen's dental 
practice. The court's valuation of the practice and the 
subsequent allocation of thei value between the parties does not 
reveal "a clear abuse of discretion." In any event, Dr. 
Sorensen did not object at trial and cannot now raise the issue 
on appeal for the first time. 
Mrs. Sorensen testified of her financial need for an 
award of attorney's fees and her attorney proferred evidence 
about the fees. Dr. Sorensen's attorney accepted the proffer 
and stipulated that if Mr. Healy were called as a witness, he 
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would testify the fees were reasonable and should be awarded. 
No contrary evidence was offered. There was sufficient 
evidence on which to base the award of attorney's fees. 
The parties agreed at the pretrial conference that the 
court would decide who should pay the expert witness fees of 
Alan Heiskanen. The court, nevertheless, has discretion in a 
divorce case to award a needy spouse the funds required to 
prosecute the action. The fees of an expert witness, similar 
to attorney's fees, fall within this discretion. 
I. The District Court Properly Valued Dr. Sorensen's Dental 
Practice. 
Dr. Sorensen claims the property division was unfair. 
He contends (his brief at 15-21) the district court improperly 
valued his dental practice by including amounts for "good will" 
and accounts receivable, but excluding any amount for accounts 
payable. He asks this Court to vacate the property division. 
The argument is ill-founded. The good will of a 
professional proprietorship is a marital asset which is 
divisible upon divorce. The district court considered all of 
the available evidence and, in its discretion, determined a 
value for the dental practice. Record evidence supports that 
determination. 
A. "Good Will" In A Professional Proprietorship Is A 
Divisable Marital Asset. 
Dr. Sorensen contends (his brief at 15-19) that, as a 
matter of law, there is no good will in a professional dental 
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practice. His argument is disarmingly simple. It is not 
persuasive, however, for at least three reasons. 
1. Dr. Sorensen Wavied the Issue by Not Objecting at 
Trial. 
The issue of good will valuation was raised on the 
first day of trial by Mrs. Sorensen1s attorney during direct 
examination of her expert witness, Dr. Richard Austin. (Tr. 
Vol. I at 70-72). Dr. Sorensen did not object. In fact, Dr. 
Sorensen called his own expert witnesses who gratuitously 
offered testimony about good will, albeit to establish a 
different value. (Tr. Vol. I at 321; Tr. Vol. II at 24). 
Having failed to object at trial, Dr. Sorensen may not now 
raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Lopez v. 
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778,781 (Utah 1986); Porcupine Reservoir 
Co. v. Llovd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318, 319, 392 P.2d 
620, 621 (1964). 
2. Dr. Sorensen*s Reliance on Jackson and Dogu is 
Not Correct. 
Dr. Sorensen supports his argument with two opinions 
from the Utah Supreme Court: Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 
81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966) and Dogu v.Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 
1982). He has not described either case accurately. 
Consider the Jackson opinion, for example. There, 
defendant claimed the good will of his former partnership was 
an asset and he was entitled to a share of its value on 
dissolution. 415 P.2d at 668-69. In resolving the issue, the 
Supreme Court embraced what it then perceived as the prevailing 
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rule:2 a professional partnership does not have good will to 
distribute as a firm asset on its dissolution. Id. at 670-71. 
The Court did not consider the rule absolute, however. It 
noted there are decisions which reach a different conclusion 
because of their particular facts and circumstances. Id. at 
670. Accordingly, the Court said the general rule applies in a 
partnership 
unless the parties have in their partnership 
agreements provided otherwise, or the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case would require a 
modification of the general rule. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) The Court reviewed the appeal record to 
determine whether the disgruntled partner had established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his former partnership had 
an asset of good will in which he was entitled to share. Id. 
z
 The original quotation taken by the Utah Supreme Court 
over 21 years ago from American Jurisprudence was dropped from 
the current volume of the encyclopedia. Compare 40 Am. Jur. 
PARTNERSHIP §271, at 316 (1942), with 59 Am. Jur. 2d 
PARTNERSHIP §338, at 413-414 (1987). American Jurisprudence 
Second concedes that what once may have been considered the 
"general rule" is not accepted now in most jurisdictions having 
considered the issue and that the existence of good will in a 
professional business is a question of fact, not law. 
The court would have been better served when deciding 
Jackson if it had relied upon 24 Am. Jur. GOOD WILL § 11, at 
808 (1942). Section 11 correctly states that the good will of 
a professional practice is a valuable, yet intangible, asset 
which can be transferred. See also Mueller v. Mueller, 144 
Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (quoting and 
applying § 11). 
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at 669. After examining the parties' prior business affairs,3 
the Court concluded "the weight of the evidence preponderates 
that under the facts and circumstances of this case" there was 
not good will in the old partnership for the partner and, for 
that reason, the finding of the district court was correct. 
Id. at 671. The Court did not rule as a matter of law in 
Jackson. It focused on the record evidence because the 
existence, valuation, and allocation of good will are questions 
of fact. 
Dr. Sorensen's reliance on Dogu is wholly misplaced. 
The facts of the case, the issues, even the dicta emphasized by 
Dr. Sorensen in his brief (at 18) — none of these address the 
issue of establishing good will. Dogu offers no guidance to 
resolve this appeal. 
3. Professional "Good Will" Is A Divisible Marital 
Asset. 
Jackson (and the opinions noted in American 
Jurisprudence) deals exclusively with the existence of good 
will in a professional business and its division among 
associates upon dissolution of the business. The existence and 
apportionment of good will incident to a divorce are treated 
3 The Court found the partners had agreed not to carry good 
will as an asset on the partnership books; at the time of 
dissolution they had valued the business assets without 
consideration for good will; and there was not an adequate 
showing the partnershp agreement contemplated the use of good 
will to compute book value. 415 P.2d at 671. 
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differently, however. A recent decision from the Arizona 
Supreme Court highlights the distinction: 
The confusion in this area of the law exists 
partially because many of the cases concerning the 
existence and evaluation of goodwill involve 
partnership dissolution, and not marital dissolution. 
Often the valuation of partnership assets, including 
goodwill, is controlled by the partnership agreement. 
In this case we are dealing with a marital dissolution 
which does not affect the continuation of the business 
partnership. The current situation is aptly described 
as follows: 
A professional practice goes automatically to the 
spouse licensed to practice it. He is not selling out 
or liquidating, but continuing in business. 
Effectively, it is the case of the silent partner 
withdrawing from a going business. And, if such 
partner is to receive fair compensation for her share, 
or her enforced retirement, it should be so evaluated. 
Brawman v. Brawman 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 882, 19 Cal. 
Rptr. 106, 109-10 (1962). 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (Ariz. 1987). 
It is essential to the proper review of this appeal to 
focus only on those opinions which address good will in the 
context of a divorce. If that is done, a distinct pattern 
emerges: all but one of the jurisdictions in the Pacific 
region which have addressed the issue, hold good will in a 
professional business is a marital asset divisible upon 
divorce.4 It is the favored rule elsewhere, too.5 
4
 See, e.g: 
ARIZONA: 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 
P.2d 208 (1987) 
(Footnotes 4 and 5 continued on next page.) 
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There is no reason to treat the issue differently in 
Utah. The statute which governs the property rights of parties 
in divorce actions reads: 
(Footnotes 4 and 5 continued.) 
Carriker v. Carriker. 151 Ariz. 296, 727 P.2d 349 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1986) 
Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1981) 
CALIFORNIA: 
In Re Marriage of Fonstein. 17 Cal. 3d 738, 131 Cal. Rptr. 
873, 552 P.2d 1169 (1976) 
In Re Marriage of Watts. 171 Cal. App. 3d 366, 217 
Cal. Rptr. 301 (Cal. App. Ct. 1985) 
In Re Marriage of Fenton. 134 Cal. App. 3d 451, 184 
Cal. Rptr. 597 (Cal. App. Ct. 1982) 
In Re Marriage of Slater. 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 160 
Cal. Rptr. 686 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Webb. 94 Cal. App. 3d 335, 156 
Cal. Rptr. 334 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979) 
In Re. Marriage of Aufmuth. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 
Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Foster. 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 
Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974) 
In Re Marriage of Lopez. 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 
Cal. Rptr. 58 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974) 
In Re Marriage of Fortier. 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 
Cal. Rptr. 915 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974) 
Todd v. Todd. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1969) 
Golden v. Golden. 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 
Cal. Rptr. 735 (Cal. App. Ct. 1969) 
Fritschi v. Teed. 213 Cal. App. 2d 718, 29 Cal. Rptr. 114 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1963) 
Brawman v. Brawman, 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1962) 
Mueller v. Mueller. 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (Cal. 
App. Ct. 1956) 
Franklin v. Franklin. 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1945) 
(Footnotes 4 and 5 continued on next page.) 
-12-
When a decree of divorce is made the court may make 
such orders in relation to the children, property and 
parties, and the maintenance of the parties and 
children, as may be equitable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1953). The Supreme Court has given 
this general instruction for the statute's application: 
(Footnotes 4 and 5 continued.) 
COLORADO: 
In Re Marriage of Nichols. 606 P.2d 1314 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1979) 
KENTUCKY: 
Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) 
MONTANA: 
In Re Marriage of Hull. 712 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1986) 
NEW MEXICO: 
Hertz v. Hertz. 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 (1983) 
Hurlev v. Hurlev. 94 N.M. 651, 615 P.2d 256 (1980) 
OREGON: 
In Re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1976) 
In Re Marriage of Steinbrenner, 60 Or. App. 106, 652 P.2d 
845 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) 
WASHINGTON: 
In Re Marriage of Hall. 103 Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 
(1984) 
Matter of Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 
1136 (1979) 
In Re Marriage of Freedman, 23 Wash. App. 27, 592 P.2d 1124 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Kaplan. 23 Wash. App. 503, 597 P.2d 439 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976) 
The issue was presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Saviers v. Saviers. 92 Idaho 117, 438 P.2d 268 (1968). There 
the wife appealed, alleging error by the trial court for its 
failure to find and value her husband's interest in the good 
will of his medical partnership. The Supreme Court found no 
(Footnotes 4 and 5 continued on next page.) 
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It is to be particularly noted that the language is in 
general terms and contains no hint of limitation. The 
import of our decisions implementing that statute is 
that proceedings in regard to the family are equitable 
in a high degree; and that the court may take into 
(Footnotes 4 and 5 continued.) 
error since the trial transcript did not contain any evidence 
from which value could be determined. 
The Court of Appeals of Idaho has held the good will of a 
family owned business (truck stop) is marital property which 
should be valued and distributed upon divorce. The court 
declined to resolve the issue in the context of a professional 
practice. Carr v. Carr, 108 Idaho 684, 701 P.2d 304, n. 4 at 
309 (Idaho App. 1985). 
CONTRA: 
KANSAS: 
Powell v. Powell. 231 Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218 (1982). 
5 see, e.g.: 
ILLINOIS: 
In Re Marriage of White, 98 111. App. 3d 380, 53 111. Dec. 
786, 424 N.E. 2d 421 (111. App. Ct. 1981) 
NEBRASKA: 
Lockwood v. Lockwood. 205 Neb. 818, 290 N.W. 2d 636 
(1980) 
NEW JERSEY: 
Dugan v. Dugan. 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1982) 
Stern v. Stern. 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975) 
Lew v. Lew. 164 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) 
NORTH CAROLINA: 
Dorton v. Dorton. 77 N.C. App. 667, 336 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. Ct, 
App. 1985) 
Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C. App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266, disc, rev, 
denied, 314 N.C. 543, 335 S.E.2d 316 (1985). 
Weaver v. Weaver. 72 N.C. App. 409, 324 S.E.2d,915 (N.C. Ct, 
App. 1985) 
(Footnote 5 continued on next page.) 
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consideration all other pertinent circumstances. It 
is our opinion that the correct view under our law is 
that this encompasses all of the assets of every 
nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and 
from whatever source derived . . . These should be 
given due consideration along with all other assets, 
income and the earnings and the potential earning 
capacity of the parties, in determining what is the 
most practical, just and equitable way to serve the 
best interests and welfare of the parties and their 
children. 
Enqlert v. Enqlert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978). (Footnotes 
omitted.) Often the major asset of many marriages is the 
professional practice managed by one spouse. The good will of 
(Footnote 5 continued.) 
NORTH DAKOTA: 
Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487 (N.D. 1978) 
See generally: 
The Valuation of a Professional Practice in Equitable 
Distribution, 22 Wake Forest L. Rev. 327 (1987) 
Professional Corporation May Have Valuable Goodwill, Apart 
from Person of Individual Member, That Must be 
Considered in Property Settlement on Divorce, 11 St. 
Mary's L. J. 222 (1979) 
Comment, Professional Goodwill as Community Property: How 
Should Idaho Rule? 14 Idaho L. Rev. 473 (1978) 
CONTRA: 
MISSOURI: 
Carter v. Carter, 616 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) 
TEXAS: 
Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972). The decision was 
discussed and criticized in The Exclusion of 
Professional Good Will from Partition on Divorce, 10 
Hous. L. Rev. 966 (1973). 
WISCONSIN: 
Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1981) 
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that practice can be valued by generally accepted accounting 
methods6 and its value can be allocated between the parties in 
accordance with the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 
30-3-5. Dr. Sorensen will continue to benefit from the good 
will established in his dental practice. Failure to value that 
good will and compensate Mrs. Sorensen accordingly would not 
comport with Utah's equitable distribution scheme. 
B. The District Court's Valuation of Dr. Sorensen*s Dental 
Practice Does not Constitute a Clear Abuse of Its 
Discretion. 
Dr. Sorensen also attacks the district court's 
calculation of the overall value of his dental practice. He 
contends the court improperly included the accounts receivable, 
but having done so, omitted any consideration of the accounts 
payable. In short, he asks this Court to substitute its 
judgment for the district court's. 
In determining whether the district court erred in 
valuing the practice, the evidence must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to support the decision. The court's actions 
are entitled to a presumption of validity. Hansen v. Hansen, 
6
 See, e.g., American Dental Association, Valuation of a 
Dental Practice: A Brief Overview for Buyers and Sellers 
(undated). 
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736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987); Burnham v. Burnham, 716 
P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986). In particular, 
[b]ecause parties often place widely disparate values 
on assets to be distributed in a divorce proceeding, 
determination of the assets' value is a matter for the 
trial court, which will not be reversed in the absence 
of a clear abuse of discretion. 
Cook v. Cook, 739 P.2d 90, 93 (Utah App. 1987). 
Dr. Sorensen contends (his brief at 19-20) it was 
error for the district court to include accounts receivable in 
the value of his practice. He relies exclusively on a 
quotation from Dogu for support of his agreement. Even a 
cursory glance at Dogu, however, reveals it says nothing of the 
kind. The Utah Supreme Court did not preclude consideration of 
receivables. Rather, the Court was only summarizing the 
district court's plan for distribution of the value of the 
husband's professional corporation to demonstrate that the 
court had not abused its discretion. 
Dr. Sorensen contends (his brief at 20-21) the 
district court ignored accounts payable when it calculated the 
value of his dental practice. He rests his contention on the 
absence of any reference to "accounts payable" in the findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, or in the decree. The argument is 
not correct. Remember that the district court accepted Dr. 
Austin's valuation of the dental practice. He testified that 
one of three components making up his valuation was a sum for 
"intangible assets." (Tr. Vol. I at 70-72). To calculate that 
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sum, Dr. Austin combined the receipts and expenses of Dr. 
Sorensen's practice to produce an average of the profits earned 
by Dr. Sorensen over a three year period. (Tr. Vol. I at 70). 
Dr. Austin testified that he reviewed the accounts payable as 
part of his review of expenses. (Tr. Vol. I at 71). Thus, the 
figures Dr. Sorensen contends were ignored, actually are 
included in the valuation of his practice,, 
Dr. Sorensen has shown the district court valued the 
practice differently than he would and perhaps even contrary to 
the testimony of his expert witness. That does not constitute 
an abuse of discretion. 
II. The District Court's Award of Attorney's Fees Is Supported 
by Evidence and By a Stipulation at Trial Between the 
Parties. 
The district court awarded Mrs. Sorensen $2,000 for 
attorney's fees. Dr. Sorensen claims (his brief at 21-24) the 
award was in error. He contends the court could not have 
awarded the fees unless it first had received evidence that the 
amount of the fees was reasonable and that Mrs. Sorensen had 
financial need. No evidence was offered on either issue, he 
concludes. 
The argument is not persuasive. It ignores the 
uncontroverted evidence received at trial and overlooks the 
stipulation made by Dr. Sorensen's own counsel. Mrs. Sorensen 
testified she had incurred substantial attorney's fees for the 
preparation of this action. (Tr. Vol. I at 145). She also 
testified she had no income other than the temporary support 
she was then receiving from her husband. (Tr. Vol. I at 148). 
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On that basis she asked the court to order her husband to pay 
the fees. (Tr. Vol. I at 148). Mrs. Sorensen's financial need 
was adequately demonstrated at trial, and satisfactorally 
established one of the necessary requirements. 
The reasonableness of the attorney's fees was 
established, too. On the first morning of trial, Mrs. Sorensen 
was examined by her trial counsel about the attorney's fees she 
had incurred: 
Q. Is it also correct, Mrs. Sorensen, in this 
particular matter, that you have incurred substantial 
attorney fees in connection with the preparation and trial 
of this case? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And is it correct, Mrs. Sorensen, that those 
attorney fees are in the neighborhood of $3,700.00? 
MR. ECHARD: Well, I'm going to object, Your Honor. I 
think the time—do you intend to present testimony later on? 
MR. HEALY: I could do that if you would like. We 
have a copy of the [billing] statement or whatever. 
MR. ECHARD: If we could review that statement over 
lunchtime, they shouldn't question what it is 
approximately, I think I could accept Counsel's statements. 
THE COURT: Well, you talk about it over lunchtime and 
see if you could proffer that. 
MR. HEALY: That's fine. 
(Tr. Vol. I at 145-146). Later that day, Mrs. Sorensen's 
attorney proffered the amount of his fees as itemized on his 
billing statement (Tr. Ex. V) and he was prepared to testify 
about the underlying justification for them: 
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MR. HEALY: Your Honor, we have also agreed that I 
would proffer to the Court at this time the attorney fees 
and state what this is based on. 
(Tr. Vol. I at 214). (Emphasis added.) The district court 
then asked Mr. Echard to stipulate to Mr* Healy's proffer. The 
court did not ask him to stipulate that the fees were 
reasonable or that they should be awarded to Mrs. Sorensen. 
Rather, the court only asked him to stipulate that if Mr. Healy 
were called as a witness, he would testify his fees were 
reasonable and they should be awarded to Mrs. Sorensen. The 
precise exchange between the court and Mr. Echard reads: 
THE COURT: Would you stipulate, Mr. Echard, that if 
Mr. Healy were to testify, that he would testify that his 
fee in this matter is $3,587.50, in addition therewith some 
witness subpoena fees. The stipulation would not go to the 
question of whether or not they are reasonable or whether 
they should be awarded, but that would be his testimony. 
May it be so stipulated? 
MR. ECHARD: It may, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court would receive the stipulation 
for that purpose. Maybe we ought to have this [billing 
statement] marked, Mr. Healy, marked as V. 
(Tr. Vol. I at 214-215). (Emphasis Added.) At the close of 
trial, Mr. Healy proffered evidence of additional fees incurred 
in the trial, Mr. Echard stipulated to the proffer with the 
same conditions accepted earlier: 
MR. ECHARD: I agreed, Your Honor, that Counsel could 
make a proffer as to attorney fees. I would not agree to 
it, but I would accept it as to what he would testify to 
with that. 
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MR. HEALY: These are additional fees in connection 
with the further Hearing. 
THE COURT: That [a second billing statement] is 
Exhibit X, and the Court will accept that as a proffer of 
additional fees in this matter. 
(Tr. Vol. II at 171). (Emphasis added.) Mr. Healy offered two 
billing statements as exhibits (Tr. Exs. V and X). They 
describe the work he performed, the hours expended, and the 
hourly rates charged. He was prepared to testify about them, 
but Mr. Echard stipulated to the substance of his testimony. 
Although he did not stipulate to the truth of Mr. Healy1s 
testimony, Mr. Echard did stipulate that Mr. Healy would 
testify, if necessary, to the reasonableness of the fees. 
Because Mr. Echard neither cross-examined Mr. Healy nor offered 
contrary evidence on the issue, Dr. Sorensen cannot now 
complain of the reasonableness. 
Ill. The District Court's Award of Expenses For Expert 
Witnesses Does Not Constitute a Clear Abuse of its 
Discretion. 
Dr. Sorensen*s final argument challenges the award of 
expert witness fees. The district court ordered the parties to 
bear the expense of their own expert witnesses, except the 
expense of Allan Heiskanen, a real estate appraiser, which the 
parties were to divide evenly. (R. 96; Decree 1f 23). Dr. 
Sorensen contends (his brief at 24-25) expert witness fees may 
not be taxed as costs beyond the $14 per diem rate permitted by 
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Utah Code Ann. §21-5-4 (1953).7 He asks this Court to vacate 
that portion of the decree requiring him to pay one-half of Mr. 
Heiskanen's fee. 
The argument is not persuasive, for it is factually 
inaccurate. On August 13, 1986, a pretrial conference was 
conducted by the Domestic Relations Commissioner, B. Maurice 
Richards. (R. 55). The parties agreed at the conference to 
have their real property appraised by an appraiser who was 
acceptable to them both. The expense of the appraiser was 
borne initially by Dr. Sorenson; the decision of ultimate 
responsibility for payment was left to the court for subsequent 
determination. The parties' agreement is memoralized in 
handwritten notes appearing on the bottom of the Pretrial 
Conference Work Sheet. (R. 54). They read: 
Parties are having the real property appraisal by an 
agreed appraiser — Def. to pay costs initially and court 
decides who finally pays. 
The parties later selected Mr. Heiskanen as their appraiser. 
Their understanding, specifically including the selection of 
7
 Section 21-5-4 provides: 
Every witness legally required or in good faith 
requested to attend upon a city or district court or a 
grand jury is entitled to $14 per day for each day in 
attendance and 30 cents for each mile actually and 
necessarily traveled in going only; provided, that in case 
of a witness's attending from without the state in a civil 
case, mileage for such witness shall be allowed and taxed 
for the distance actually and necessarily traveled within 
the state in going only. 
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Mr. Heiskanen, was made a part of the pre-trial order on 
September 4, 1986: 
An appraisal of the family home occupied by 
plaintiff,the dental office occupied by defendant, and the 
farm in Liberty, Utah, will be made by Alan Heiskanen with 
the cost of said appraisals to be paid by defendant and the 
ultimate responsibility for the cost of said appraisals to 
be determined by the Court. 
(R. 57-58). Dr. Sorensen's attorney, Mr. Echard, approved the 
form of the order. (R. 59). He did not file an objection to 
it; neither did he request further hearing on it. Dr. Sorensen 
is deemed to have consented to the order. 
Mr. Heiskanen appraised the properties and testified 
at trial about their value. (Tr. Vol. I at 6-36). The 
district court then divided evenly between the parties the 
responsibility for payment of his expenses. That is precisely 
what the parties and the pretrial proceedings contemplated. 
There is an additional consideration. Nothing 
indicates the witness fee was awarded as a "cost." Rather, the 
fee was a "litigation expense," much like attorney's fees. 
Ordinarily, such expenses are not recoverable by the party 
prevailing in litigation. Divorce proceedings are different, 
however. Section 30-3-3 allows a court discretion to award a 
party such sums as will permit that party to bring or defend an 
action. Historically, the statute has permitted an award of 
attorney's fees, so long as the requesting party showed need 
and the reasonableness of the fee. An expert witness, under 
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appropriate circumstances, is as necessary to the successfull 
prosecution or defense of an action as an attorney. The 
district court had discretion to award Mrs. Sorensen a portion 
of her expert witness fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Sorensen asks this Court (i) to affirm the 
decision of the district court; (ii) to award her the costs she 
has incurred on appeal; and (iii) to award her attorney's fees 
for defending this appeal. 
DATED this 2nd day of November, 1987. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Reid E. Lewis 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
Elaine S. Sorensen 
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